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4.1 Introduction
In the era of globalization, the event of an economy’s accession to the
World Trade Organization (WTO) invariably attracts widespread atten-
tion. The recent events of China’s successful accession to the WTO and Rus-
sia’s push to obtain WTO membership are just two such instances. Many
developing and emerging-market countries believe that the accession
to the WTO would enhance their productivity and economic prosperity.
Nevertheless, the real impact of the accession to the WTO on the produc-
tivity of a developing or emerging-market economy remains unanswered.
The WTO, whose former incarnation is the General Agreement on
Trade and Tariﬀ (GATT), is an international organization with 144 econ-
omies as its members in 2002. It has played a signiﬁcant role in promoting
international trade and pushing for greater integration of the world econ-
omy. In GATT’s forty-eight years of history until 1994, trade barriers
among member economies fell signiﬁcantly. Under the three main prin-
ciples of “most-favored-nation status,” “national treatment,” and “consen-
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edged.tariﬀs on traded manufactured goods fell from an average of 40 percent be-
fore the organization was established to less than 5 percent in the 1990s.
Meanwhile, the volume of international trade has been increasing twice as
fast as the output of the world since the 1950s.
The event of accession to GATT/WTO is actually an important testing
case of the much more general and bigger issue of globalization, which has
been controversial. We summarize that there are two broad groups of con-
troversies about globalization. The ﬁrst group of controversies is general.
They are about who, if anyone, beneﬁts from globalization. There have
been econometric studies of the positive impact of trade liberalization on
economic growth and development (e.g., Harrison 1996). More generally,
the view of the advantage of backwardness that low-income economies
ought to beneﬁt from opening up to the world economy, as popularized by
Alexander Gerschenkron’s theory of the advantage of backwardness (Ger-
schenkron 1962), seems to be widely accepted. However, some have chal-
lenged whether openness is a by-product or measure of other more funda-
mental changes in the domestic economy (e.g., Rodriguez and Rodrik 2000;
Kenny and Williams 2001). According to this view, “integration into the
world economy” cannot “substitute for a development strategy.” Further-
more, after the recent Asian ﬁnancial crises, some argue that the globaliza-
tion, especially hastened by improper order of sequencing, can produce a
detrimental eﬀect on developing countries (Rodrik 1997; Stiglitz 2002).
The second cluster of controversies is about particular consequences of
opening up. For example, what will happen to inward foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) once a country opens up? One often-made argument is
that inward FDI will fall based on the tariﬀ-jumping theory (Brecher and
Diaz-Alejandro, 1977). That is to say, FDI is an alternative way to enter a
market when export is not a feasible option under high import tariﬀs be-
fore a country joins GATT/WTO. Import and FDI are substitutes. The
drastic reduction in import tariﬀs makes direct export to the target mar-
keta   feasible option. After a country joins the GATT/WTO, therefore,
the FDI will fall. A competing hypothesis is that FDI will increase after
a country opens up. This happens because a reduction of trade barriers
makes the economy more likely to become a production base to serve the
world market. In turn, more FDI results in increases in intraﬁrm trade in
intermediate goods so that the volume of international trade will also in-
crease. Hence, FDI and exports are complements.
Accession to GATT/WTO provides a useful event study to facilitate the
debates on these two sets of issues. The accession cases happen relatively
quickly so that simultaneous changes in other factors are easy to control
for. Also, by comparing what happened before and after the accession in
an accession economy, one can control for heterogeneity across diﬀerent
economies. Both factors are advantages over cross-sectional studies cover-
ing many years.
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GATT/WTO accession across countries, although there are many country-
speciﬁc studies of GATT/WTO accessions, such as Milthorp (1997);
Mutti, Sampson, and Yeung (2000); and Fernandez de Cordoba and Ke-
hoe (2000). A recent exception is Rose (2002), who ﬁnds that WTO acces-
sion did not visibly increase an economy’s trade. This is surprising, given
the existence of widely diﬀerent theories and opinions on these issues and
extensive observations of the event of GATT/WTO accession.
Apparently, the impact of the GATT/WTO accession is likely to be dif-
ferent on diﬀerent types of economies. We therefore classify the economies
in two alternative ways. The ﬁrst approach is to divide the sample economy
into two groups by the level of per capita GDP of 1987, the median year of
our sample. We call the economies with per capita GDP over US$3,000
high-income economies and others low-income ones. This classiﬁcation is
motivated by Gerschenkron’s theory of the advantage of backwardness.
Another classiﬁcation is by the institutional conﬁguration of an economy.
We are inspired by the work of La Porta et al. (1999), who argue that the
origin of the economy’s legal institutions is a key factor aﬀecting economic
performance. We thus divide the economies into common-law economies,
continental European law economies, and formerly socialist systems. Our
classiﬁcation of the economies in this fashion comes from La Porta et al.
(1999).
4.2 The Data Set and Methodology
In spirit, we are following the method of “event study.”1 That is, we col-
lect data on those economies before and after they became members of
GATT/WTO and study whether there are signiﬁcant changes in those
economies. In doing so, we also need to include in our sample countries
that did not join GATT/WTO in the same period, including countries that
had already been members of the GATT/WTO by the beginning of the
sample year. The method of event study has been widely used in econom-
ics and ﬁnance literature. An advantage of event study over standard cross-
section or time series analysis is that it enables us to concentrate on the
event itself, which usually happens in a short time window with few other
changes at the same time.
4.2.1 The Data Set
Our sample covers 112 economies from 1960 to 1998. The sample con-
sists of almost all economies in the world, except those that underwent pro-
longed wars during the covered years, such as the Congo, Iran, Iraq, and
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1. See MacKinlay (1997) for a detailed survey of event study methods applied in econom-
ics and ﬁnance.so on, and economies that have had major boundary changes during the
sample years, since we cannot ﬁnd consistent economic statistics on those
boundary-changing economies over time. Examples in the latter group in-
clude most of the former Soviet republics. Table 4.1 lists the names of all
economies in the sample with their descriptive statistics.
The sample consists of seventy-four economies that joined GATT/WTO
during the sample years and eighteen economies that had already joined
GATT/WTO by 1960 and twenty that had not become members of GATT/
WTO by 1998. The latter group forms a reference for us to examine the
impact of GATT/WTO accessions. Also, we classify the sample economies
by the level of per capita GDP in 1987. This way, we divide the sample into
high-income and low-income economies. We also classify the sample
economies by their legal economic systems: common law, continental Eu-
ropean law, and socialist economic system. Table 4.2 provides summary
statistics of the diﬀerent types of the sample economies.
Data sources include the World Investment Reportof the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the International Fi-
nancial Statistics(IFS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World
Development Indices (WDI) of the World Bank, and publications by
GATT/WTO.
4.2.2 Economic Variables Examined
We  are interested in two sets of economic indices of the accession
economies. The ﬁrst set of economic variables is GDP, export in constant
U.S. dollars and constant local currency, the ratio of import and export to
GDP, logarithm of FDI, and the ratio of FDI to GDP, respectively. These
variables measure the openness of the economy. The second economic in-
dex of our concern is the growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP),
which is the term in the aggregate production function besides those of
capital and labor. The TFP is a measure of the overall eﬃciency of the
economy.
4.2.3 The Duration of the Impact of the Accession
In modeling the impact of the GATT/WTO accession, we need to spec-
ify the duration of the impact. One cannot expect the accession to have a
permanent impact on the growth rate of the economic variables of the
economy while a permanent shift in the level of the economic variable is
likely. Ideally, with a long enough time horizon in panel data, one can en-
dogenously specify the time pattern of the impact. Unfortunately, this is
not the case in the study, since we only have thirty-nine years of observa-
tion in total for a typical country, and for a typical accession economy we
only have ﬁfteen years of observation after accession.
Facing this limit, we constrain our model to the speciﬁcation that the
impact of the accession is within ten years. That is, starting from the

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6accession year, the growth rate of the economic variables of our concern
may have a constant upward shift in each year. After the tenth year, there is
no change in the growth rate. We also repeated all the estimation proce-
dures by using eight and twelve years as the alternative time span of impact,
and the results are very similar. This gives us conﬁdence that ten years is a
good approximation of the duration of the accession eﬀect on an economy.
4.2.4 The Classiﬁcation of Economies
We classify the economies in two alternative ways in order to examine
potentially diﬀerent eﬀects of the GATT/WTO accessions. The two classi-
ﬁcations are most likely to be relevant to explaining an economy’s response
to its GATT/WTO accession. The ﬁrst classiﬁcation is by per capita GDP.
We follow the World Bank classiﬁcation and use the economies’ per capita
GDP in 1987 to divide all the sample economies into high-income and
medium- or low-income economies. The dividing per capita GDP level is
3,000 constant U.S. dollars in 1987. In principle, we can also have more re-
ﬁned classiﬁcation by further dividing the economies with per capita in-
come below US$3,000 into medium- and low-income groups. However,
there is a data constraint that prevents us from estimating models with such
reﬁned classiﬁcations: We do not have many low-income economies that
joined GATT/WTO during the sample years.
The second classiﬁcation is by initial social economic institutions. We
have three categories: economies that originated from common-law legal
institutions, from continental European legal institutions, and from so-
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1951 1951–1998 1998 Nonmembers
Average population in 1987 
(in millions) 97.5 11.2 273 8.3
Average per capita GDP in 1987 
(in 1995 US$) 4,187.6 3,734.6 2,095.0 2,985.3
Average import/GDP ratio in 
1987 (%) 22.1 45.2 29.5 43.58
Average export/GDP ratio in 
1987 (%) 20 40.5 28.1 31.9
No. of economies of common 
law origin 6 31 0 4
No. of former Socialist systems 8 39 2 7
No. of economies of continental 
European legal origin 0 8 2 3
Note:There are two countries (Korea and Liechtenstein) that belong to the German legal system. There-
fore, the total number of countries in this table is 110.cialist systems, respectively. The classiﬁcation is borrowed from La Porta
et al. (1999). In theory, one can further divide the continental European
law countries into the French type, the German type, and the Scandinavian
type. Again, the data set does not contain enough economies to allow us to
go into such detailed classiﬁcation. In the study, we group French, Ger-
man, and Scandinavian economies into the category of continental Euro-
pean legal origin.
4.2.5 Dealing with the Endogeneity Issue of GATT/WTO Accessions
Our objective is to study the impact of the event of the accession to
GATT/WTO on the accession economy. To achieve that goal, we must deal
with the question of endogeneity. That is, it is likely that economies did not
or were not selected randomly to join GATT/WTO, and by the time an
economy was able to access to GATT/WTO, its economic performance al-
ready began to be diﬀerent from its past and from those non–GATT/WTO
members. This is a classical sample selection problem. In other words,
when we see an economy’s performance improved after its GATT/WTO
accession, was the improvement due to the action of the accession and sub-
sequent policy and institutional changes? Or was it due to the fact that the
economy in question had reached a new plateau of economic development
and openness, enabling it to have better economic performance than be-
fore, which was certiﬁed by existing members of GATT/WTO in approving
it to be a new member?
This is a critical and often pesky issue in similar empirical studies. We
take two alternative methods to deal with the sample selection problem.
The ﬁrst method is due to Heckman and Hotz (1989). The idea is that if an
economy, indexed by i, is chosen in year t to be a member of GATT/WTO,
i must already have been intrinsically diﬀerent by year t, which enables ex-
isting members of GATT/WTO to award membership to country i in year
t. Although we obviously cannot measure how intrinsically diﬀerent i had
become by year t, we can generate a variable called the selection variable as
a regressor in the regressions to capture this eﬀect. The selection variable
takes on the value 0 before year t – 2 and then the values of 1, 2, 3, 4, . . .
for the subsequent years of t–2, t–1, t 1, . . . , respectively. The estimated
coeﬃcients of the selection variable tell us how intrinsically diﬀerent an ac-
cession economy is starting from two years before the accession. For in-
stance, in a regression of log(GDP), if the coeﬃcient of the selection vari-
able is 0.02 and statistically signiﬁcant, then this tells us that, on average,
those economies that joined GATT/WTO began to perform diﬀerently two
years before the accession. Their GDP level was 2 percent higher each year
two years before the actual accession year until one year after the accession
year. This hypothetical ﬁnding would imply that the GATT/WTO acces-
sion mechanism selected those economies that had an initial jump in GDP
118 David D. Li and Changqi Wuto be new members. In the same regression, the WTO dummy that takes on
nonzero values after the year of accession is left to capture the actual ac-
cession eﬀect that we are interested in.
Why did we choose the t –2 to t time window for the selection variable?
The answer is that we also experimented with alternative conﬁgurations,
including t – 5, or t – 4, or t – 3 to t   1, or t   2. The ﬁndings are qualita-
tively similar, so we only report the t – 2 to t results.
The other approach that we adopted to deal with the endogeneity issue
of GATT/WTO accessions is to explicitly model the endogenous selection
eﬀect. We model the endogenous selection eﬀect as one that starts to exist
when an economy is perceived to be qualiﬁed and acceptable to be a mem-
ber of GATT/WTO. Let us call this the qualiﬁcation date. Note that the
qualiﬁcation date and the actual accession date, in principle, are diﬀerent
and separated by noneconomic and random factors, such as political and
diplomatic disputes. The qualiﬁcation date may be earlier than the actual
accession date, since political issues may delay accession negotiations; for
example, the midair collision of military aircraft in the South China Sea in
2001 signiﬁcantly slowed down China’s scheduled accession negotiations
with the United States. Similarly, the qualiﬁcation date may be later than
the accession date in cases of premature accessions, when some existing
members of GATT desired earlier acceptance of a nonmember economy
for political considerations. Examples include Hungary in the 1970s, when
it was still a socialist economy but was relatively politically friendly to the
West and therefore was eagerly accepted by Western members of the
GATT.
The strategy for us to implement the foregoing idea consists of two steps.
First, we try to explain econometrically when an economy is qualiﬁed to be
a member of WTO. To do this, we run a probit regression explaining the
event of GATT/WTO accession. The implicit assumption is that the actual
date of accession and the qualiﬁcation date are separated by random noise.
The independent variables are lagged per capita income, import-GDP, ex-
port-GDP, and legal origin. Second, we use the ﬁtted probit regression to
predict when an economy is qualiﬁed to be a member of the WTO. We then
use this estimated qualiﬁcation date to generate a selection dummy vari-
able for use in our main regressions in order to isolate and capture the se-
lection eﬀect. The selection dummy is 0 before the qualiﬁcation date and is
1, 2, 3, . . . , afterward. That is, we model that after an economy is qualiﬁed
to be a member of GATT/WTO, it might be on a growth path diﬀerent
from the variable of our concern.
Note that the actual accession eﬀect, which is our main concern, rather
than the selection eﬀect, by deﬁnition only starts to take place upon the ac-
tual accession of an economy to GATT/WTO. Thus, in regression, we can
use the accession dummy as an independent variable to capture this eﬀect.
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We estimate two sets of econometric models. The ﬁrst one is to examine
the impact of accession on individual economic variables of the economy
such as GDP, capital stock, import and export, and FDI. Let xitbe the one
of the variables previously mentioned, and the ﬁrst set of regressions are as
follows:
(1) log(xit)    i  ∑
J
j 1
( jT t    jSelectionit    jWTOit)jDummyit   εit,
where  i is a country-speciﬁc scale factor, which allows diﬀerent countries
to have diﬀerent initial levels of economic variable x; that is, it is the ﬁxed
eﬀects coeﬃcient. j is an index of the type of the economy (e.g., high in-
come or low income; common law, continental law, or formerly socialist
economy).  jis type J economy’s normal growth rate of variable x. T tis time
trend, equaling to 1, 2, . . . , for the years of 1960, 1961, respectively.  j is
the coeﬃcient capturing the endogenous selection eﬀect of GATT/WTO
accessions. Selectionit is a variable to index the selection eﬀect. There are
two alternative methods to valuate Selectionit, corresponding to the two al-
ternative methods explained above. WTOit is the timer of the actual acces-
sion: It equals to 1, 2, . . . , 10, for the ﬁrst, second, . . . , tenth year of ac-
cession, and it remains at the level of 10 after the tenth year of accession.
Finally, we assume that the error term εitis independent across country (in-
dexed by i) but might be correlated across time (indexed by t).
As explained, we use two alternative measures of the variable Selectionit.
The ﬁrst method comes from Heckman and Hotz (1989) and lets Selectionit
be equal to 0 until three years before the accession, when it becomes 1, 2, 3
for the three years right before the accession. After the accession, Selec-
tionit stays at 3.  j is the coeﬃcient of the actual accession impact, which is
our main concern. Figure 4.1 illustrates the valuation of Selectionit in this
method together with the WTOit variable.
The alternative valuation of Selectionitis the following. Let ACCit 0 or
ACCit   1 depending on our prediction of whether country i is already a
member of GATT/WTO by year t. The prediction is based on a ﬁtted pro-
bit regression of GATT/WTO membership on one-year lagged per capita
income, import-GDP, export-GDP, and legal origin. As for Selectionit, it is
0 if ACCit   0 and it is 1, 2, 3, . . . , respectively, after the ﬁrst year in which
ACCit   1.
The economic interpretation of model (1) is that for a type J economy,
the economic variable x has a steady-state growth rate of  i, and after the
accession, within ten years, the growth rate further changes by  j.  j cap-
tures the eﬀect on the economy when the economy is selected or qualiﬁed
to be a member of GATT/WTO.
The second set of regressions that we estimate are for discovering the im-
120 David D. Li and Changqi Wupact of the GATT/WTO on productivity changes in the economy. The
model is as follows:
(2) log(GDP it)    i  ∑
J
j 1
( jT t    jSelectionit    jWTOit) jDummy it
























  it   ∑
HighIncome
q LowIncome
[ qK log(Capitalit) 
   qL log(Laborit)]qDummyit   εit,
where  i is a country-speciﬁc coeﬃcient capturing initial productivity
diﬀerences among countries (i.e., the ﬁxed eﬀects coeﬃcient).   Import,
 Export, and  FDI are the coeﬃcients measuring the potential inﬂuence of
openness on the economy’s productivity.  j and  j are parameters to cap-
ture the selection and the accession impact, respectively, similar to model
(1).  qK and  qL are the elasticity coeﬃcients of capital and labor, respec-
tively, for income group q. q indexes either high-income or low-income
countries, since high-income and low-income economies may adopt
diﬀerent production technology. That is, we allow the possibility that the
capital and labor elasticities vary across diﬀerent types of economies. All
other variables and parameters are the same as or similar to those in equa-
tion (1).
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Fig. 4.1 The selection eﬀect and the accession eﬀect
Note: Year 0 stands for the accession year.4.3 The Findings
4.3.1 Predictions of the Qualiﬁcation for GATT/WTO Membership
Table 4.3 reports the estimation results of the probit regression of the
GATT/WTO membership. The dependent variable is whether country i
had already become a member of GATT/WTO by year t with 1 correspon-
ding to yes and 0 to no, respectively. This is to be used to predict which
economies would be qualiﬁed to be members of GATT/WTO at various
years, which, in turn, is used to capture the selection eﬀect of the GATT/
WTO accessions. As expected, it shows that an economy’s GDP per capita
is a signiﬁcant predictor of its GATT/WTO membership. So is the extent
of the economy’s openness as measured by import-GDP, export-GDP, and
FDI-GDP. Meanwhile, other things being equal, economies with com-
mon-law origins are more likely to be members of GATT/WTO than those
with continental-law origins and socialist economies. This is perhaps be-
cause economies with common-law origins are more credibly adaptable to
externally imposed regulations of GATT/WTO.
Based on the estimation results, we predict which economies would be-
gin to be qualiﬁed as members of GATT/WTO, and by which year. Tables
4.4 to 4.6 give the predictions. Among the 18 economies that were already
GATT members before 1960, we predicted that 13 of them would have
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Table 4.3 A Probit Regression of GATT/WTO Membership
WTO/GATT Membership (Yes   1) 
Independent Variable (panel data probit with random eﬀect)
One Year Lagged Per Capita GDP 0.00014∗∗∗
(12.79)
One Year Lagged Import/GDP 0.023∗∗∗
(8.87)
One Year Lagged Export/GDP 0.0080∗∗∗
(2.89)
Continental Law Origin Dummy –0.50∗∗∗
(–5.03)





No. of observations 3,254
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.joined GATT either before 1960 or during 1960–98. Out of the 18 econo-
mies, 5 were predicted not to have joined GATT/WTO by 1998. For the 74
economies that joined GATT/WTO between 1960 and 1998, 45 economies
were predicted to have joined before the actual accession year; 15 were pre-
dicted to have joined after the actual date; and 14 were predicted to have
never accessed in the 1960–98 window. Finally, for the 20 economies that
had not joined GATT/WTO by 1998, we predicted that 11 of them would
have joined by 1998 and 5 otherwise (for 4 other economies, we do not have
available data to make the predictions).
4.3.2 Impact on Import, Export, and Foreign Direct Investment
Tables 4.7 to 4.10report results of regressions of various measures of im-
port. As dependent variable, the regressions use three alternative measures
of imports: import in constant U.S. dollars, import in constant local cur-
rency, and the ratio of import to GDP (both are in constant local currency
and the ratio is in percentage). Note that the ratio of import to GDP is of-
ten regarded as a measure of openness of the economy.
Looking at the regressions with income dummies as reported in tables4.7
and 4.8, one can easily ﬁnd a consistent pattern. That is, after accession,
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Table 4.4 The Actual and Predicted Accession Years for Economies that Had Been
Members of GATT by 1960
Predicted 
Country Accession Year Accession Year
Predicted to be Members of GATT/GATT (13 economies)
South Africa June 1948  1960
New Zealand July 1948 1987
Pakistan July 1948 1980
Sri Lanka July 1948  1960
Zimbabwe July 1948 1976
Chile March 1949 1986
Greece March 1950 1967
Dominican Republic May 1950 1985
Italy May 1950  1960
Nicaragua May 1950 1974
Turkey October 1951 1997
Uruguay December 1953 1976
Ghana October 1957  1960
Predicted Not to be Members of GATT/WTO before 1998 (5 economies)
Brazil July 1948 n.a.
India July 1948 n.a.
Haiti January 1950 n.a.
Indonesia February 1950 n.a.
Peru October 1951 n.a.Table 4.5 The Actual and Predicted Accession Years for Economies that Joined
GATT/WTO during 1960–1998
Predicted
Country Accession Year Accession Year
Economies Whose Predicted Accession was Earlier than Actual Accession (45 economies)
Angola April 1994 1993
Antigua and Barbuda March 1987 1978
Bahrain December 1993 1981
Barbados February 1967  1960
Belize October 1983 1981
Bolivia September 1990 1974
Botswana August 1987  1960
Costa Rica December 1990 1966
Czech Republic April 1993 1993
Djibouti December 1994 1992
Dominica April 1993 1978
El Salvador May 1991 1974
Fiji November 1993  1960
Gabon May 1963  1960
Grenada October 1994 1978
Guyana July 1966  1960
Honduras April 1994 1975
Hong Kong April 1986 1961
Ireland December 1967  1960
Israel July 1962  1960
Jamaica December 1963  1960
KenyaF e bruary 1964  1960
Korea, Republic of April 1967 1967
Kuwait May 1963 1963
Lesotho January 1988  1960
Macao November 1991 1987
Malta November 1964  1960
Mauritius September 1970  1960
Namibia September 1992 1981
Panama September 1997 1981
Papua New Guinea December 1994 1962
Paraguay January 1994 1987
St. Kitts and Nevis March 1994 1978
Singapore August 1973 1966
Slovak Republic April 1993 1993
Slovenia October 1994 1992
Solomon Islands December 1994 1981
Suriname March 1978 1971
Swaziland, Kingdom of February 1993 1971
Thailand November 1982 1968
Trinidad and Tobago October 1962  1960
Tunisia August 1990 1975
United Arab Emirates March 1994 1974
Venezuela August 1990 1974
Zambia February 1982  1960high-income economies had statistically signiﬁcant increases in the growth
rate of import and in the ratio of import to GDP. The increases were also
economically signiﬁcant: The increase in the growth rate of import is
around 5 percent per year and from 0.79 percent to 1.04 percent per year
in the percentage of import-GDP. In contrast, the ﬁndings about low-
income economies are mixed. Table 4.7 shows no statistically signiﬁcant
results on the selection and accession eﬀects for low-income economies.
Table 4.8 shows negative coeﬃcients of the selection eﬀect but positive
ones for the accession eﬀect.
Tables 4.9 and 4.10 show a general pattern of the impact of GATT/WTO
accessions on economies of diﬀerent legal institutions. Continental-law
economies showed statistically and economically signiﬁcant increases in
GATT/WTO Accession and Productivity 125
Table 4.5 (continued)
Predicted
Country Accession Year Accession Year
Economies Whose Predicted Accession was Later than Actual Accession (15 economies)
Argentina October 1967 1972
Central African Republic May 1963 1967
Côte d’Ivoire December 1963 1974
Cyprus July 1963 1976
Egypt May 1970 1980
Gambia February 1965 1967
Maldives April 1983 1986
Mauritania September 1963 1973
Mexico August 1986 1996
Mozambique July 1992 1993
The Philippines December 1979 1993
Portugal May 1962 1965
Senegal September 1963 1974
Spain August 1963 1964
Togo March 1964 1970
Economies that Are Predicted Not to Join GATT/WTO by 1998 (14 economies)
Bangladesh December 1972 n.a.
Benin September 1963 n.a.
Bulgaria December 1996 n.a.
Cameroon May 1963 n.a.
Colombia October 1981 n.a.
Ecuador January 1996 n.a.
Guatemala October 1991 n.a.
Guinea December 1994 n.a.
Hungary September 1973 n.a.
The Kyrgyz Republic December 1998 n.a.
Mali January 1993 n.a.
Mongolia January 1997 n.a.
Morocco June 1987 n.a.
Romania November 1971 n.a.Table 4.6 The Actual and Predicted Accession Years for Economies that Had Not
Been Members of GATT/WTO by 1998
Country Accession Year Predicted Accession Year




Equatorial Guinea n.a. 1986
Estonia n.a. 1993
Jordan April 2000 1977
Lebanon n.a. 1990
Oman November 2000 1969
Puerto Rico n.a. 1961
Saudi Arabia n.a. 1961
Seychelles n.a. 1977
Tonga n.a. 1982
Predicted Not to Join by 1998 (4 economies)
Albania September 2000 n.a.
China November 2001 n.a.
Kazakhstan n.a. n.a.
Turkmenistan n.a. n.a.
Table 4.7 Regressions of Measures of Import with Income Dummies Using the
Heckman and Hotz (1989) Method to Control for Selection Endogeneity
Dependent Variable
Log(Import) Log(Import) Import/GDP
(U.S.$) (local constant currency) (%)
Year   HighIncome 0.052∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(31.28) (33.36) (2.81)
Year   LowIncome 0.039∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗
(35.70) (34.60) (16.06)
Selection   HighIncome 0.024 0.012 2.47∗∗∗
(1.19) (0.60) (4.95)
Selection   LowIncome 0.0018 0.0062 –0.28
(0.15) (0.53) (–0.89)
Accession   HighIncome 0.050∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗
(7.56) (7.36) (5.04)
Accession   LowIncome 0.0057 0.0053 –0.057
(1.28) (1.20) (–0.48)
Intercept –63.61∗∗∗ –62.80∗∗∗ 657.04∗∗∗
(–35.12) (–34.62) (–13.99)
R2 0.646 0.636 0.163
No. of observations 2,855 3,067 3,398
Notes: T-statistics are in parentheses. HighIncome   1 if in 1987 the GDP/Population  
U.S.$3,000; otherwise, LowIncome  1. Selection  0 until two years before GATT/WTO ac-
cession; Selection   1, 2, 3, 3, 3, . . . thereafter.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.all three measures of import. The increase in the growth rate of import was
around 3 percent per year and from 0.25 percent to 0.28 percent in the per-
centage of import to GDP. Common-law economies also had signiﬁcant
increase in import but mostly in the ratio of import to GDP. The increase
in the import/GDP percentage was 0.25 percent or .037 percent, depend-
ing on the conﬁguration of the regressions. As for the socialist economies,
we found that the accession eﬀect was negative in the ratio of import to
GDP ratio, although the selection eﬀect was positive. A robust result is the
decrease around 1 percent or 1.5 percent per year after the accession in the
percentage of import-GDP.
Tables 4.11 to 4.14 report regressions of the impact of GATT/WTO ac-
cessions on export. The regressions are of three alternative measures of ex-
port: export in constant U.S. dollars, export in constant local currency, and
export-GDP, respectively. Similar to import-GDP, the ratio of export to
GDP is often regarded as a measure of dependence of the economy on for-
eign markets as well as international competitiveness.
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Table 4.8 Regressions of Measures of Import with Income Dummies




(U.S.$) (local constant currency) (%)
Year   HighIncome 0.041∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.083
(14.19) (14.25) (0.93)
Year   LowIncome 0.050∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗
(36.00) (35.19) (12.58)
Selection   HighIncome 0.016∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.081
(4.78) (5.31) (0.84)
Selection   LowIncome –0.02∗∗∗ –0.02∗∗∗ –0.039
(–11.16) (–11.11) (–0.79)
Accession   HighIncome 0.050∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗
(8.27) (7.66) (7.00)
Accession   LowIncome 0.0094∗∗ 0.0097∗∗ –0.080
(2.30) (2.36) (–0.70)
Intercept –72.14∗∗∗ –69.26∗∗∗ 650.50∗∗∗
(–28.25) (–26.26) (–8.39)
R2 0.664 0.653 0.157
No. of observations 2,855 3,067 3,398
Notes: T-statistics are in parentheses. HighIncome   1 if in 1987 the GDP/Population  
U.S.$3,000; otherwise, LowIncome   1. Selection   0 before predicted GATT/WTO acces-
sion; Selection   1, 2, 3, 4, . . . thereafter.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.From tables 4.11 and 4.12, we can see that the high-income economies
had signiﬁcant increases in the growth rate of export (3 percent to 5 per-
cent per year) and in export-GDP (1.2 percent to 1.5 percent per year) due
to the accession eﬀect. Low-income economies also experienced increases
in the growth rate of export, but the magnitude of increase, around 1 per-
cent per year, is signiﬁcantly smaller than that of the high-income coun-
terparts. Moreover, there is some evidence (in one regression) that low-
income economies experienced slight decreases (0.2 percent a year) in the
ratio of export to GDP (table 4.12).
The results in tables 4.13 and 4.14 show that those continental-law
economies enjoyed positive and signiﬁcant accession eﬀects in export.
The growth of export increased by around 1 to 2 percent per year due to
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Table 4.9 Regressions Measures of Import with Legal Origin Dummies Using the
Heckman and Hotz (1989) Method to Control for Selection Endogeneity
Dependent Variable
Log(Import) Log(Import) Import/GDP
(U.S.$) (local constant currency) (%)
Year   CommonLaw 0.039∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
(22.48) (23.90) (9.58)
Year   ContinentalLaw 0.044∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗
(34.69) (34.18) (10.69)
Year   Socialist 0.058∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗
(8.12) (8.02) (4.36)
Selection   CommonLaw 0.037∗∗ 0.029 0.89∗∗
(2.06) (1.62) (2.13)
Selection   ContinentalLaw –0.017 –0.019 –0.11
(–1.14) (–1.29) (–0.30)
Selection   Socialist –0.32∗∗∗ –0.32∗∗∗ 2.58∗∗
(–6.65) (–6.57) (2.30)
Accession   CommonLaw 0.0045 0.00025 0.27∗
(0.69) (0.004) (1.74)
Accession   ContinentalLaw 0.028∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗
(5.18) (5.76) (1.96)
Accession   Socialist –0.0040 –0.0040 –0.97∗
(–0.18) (–0.18) (–1.85)
Intercept –61.99∗∗∗ –60.93∗∗∗ –690.84∗∗∗
(–30.41) (–30.02) (–14.21)
R2 0.576 0.564 0.151
No. of observations 2,855 3,067 3,398
Notes: T-statistics are in parentheses. Selection   0 until two years before GATT/WTO ac-
cession; Selection   1, 2, 3, 3, 3, . . . thereafter.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.accession, and the export-GDP ratio increased by about 0.2 percent per
year. The common-law economies showed mixed signs in changes in the
growth rate of export but signiﬁcant increases in export-GDP (around 0.5
percent to 0.7 percent per year). However, the socialist economies actu-
ally experienced decreases in export-GDP due to the accession eﬀect in
the magnitude of 0.7 percent to 0.9 percent per year, although the acces-
sion did seem to have chosen the faster-growing socialist economies in ex-
port.
Tables 4.15 to 4.18 list regressions of two alternative measures of FDI:
log(FDI) and FDI-GDP ratio. Tables 4.15 and 4.16 are about the impact
of GATT/WTO accession on high- and low-income economies. They show
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Table 4.10 Regressions of Measures of Import with Legal Origin Dummies




(U.S.$) (local constant currency) (%)
Year   CommonLaw 0.051∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗
(13.73) (13.68) (2.88)
Year   ContinentalLaw 0.046∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
(28.49) (27.85) (10.84)
Year   Socialist 0.046∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗
(6.65) (6.57) (5.45)
Selection   CommonLaw –0.013∗∗∗ –0.011∗∗∗ 0.11
(–3.24) (–2.70) (0.94)
Selection   ContinentalLaw –0.0059∗∗∗ –0.0050∗∗ –0.22∗∗∗
(–2.59) (–2.25) (–4.04)
Selection   Socialist 0.093∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 2.44∗∗∗
(2.77) (2.74) (2.87)
Accession   CommonLaw 0.011∗ 0.0054 0.37∗∗
(1.75) (0.86) (2.48)
Accession   ContinentalLaw 0.026∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(5.15) (5.75) (2.37)
Accession   Socialist –0.042∗ –0.042∗ –1.49∗∗∗
(–1.81) (–1.79) (2.65)
Intercept –71.47∗∗∗ –68.75∗∗∗ –770.57∗∗∗
(–22.00) (–20.96) (–8.07)
R2 0.572 0.560 0.155
No. of observations 2,855 3,067 3,398
Notes: T-statistics are in parentheses. Selection   0 until two years before GATT/WTO ac-
cession; Selection   1, 2, 3, 4, . . . , thereafter.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.Table 4.12 Regressions of Measures of Export with Income Dummies




(U.S.$) (local constant currency) (%)
Year   HighIncome 0.062∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.012
(21.45) (22.30) (0.16)
Year   LowIncome 0.050∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
(36.52) (36.64) (9.62)
Selection   HighIncome –0.0030 –0.0052 0.072
(–0.90) (–1.61) (0.87)
Selection   LowIncome –0.014∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ –0.013
(–7.83) (7.93) (–0.30)
Accession   HighIncome 0.054∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 1.51∗∗∗
(9.13) (8.04) (11.85)
Accession   LowIncome 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ –0.13
(3.47) (3.54) (–1.36)
Intercept –85.03∗∗∗ –84.47∗∗∗ –388.69∗∗∗
(–33.44) (–32.79) (–5.87)
R2 0.709 0.700 0.147
No. of observations 2,859 3,070 3,402
Notes: See table 4.8.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
Table 4.11 Regressions of Measures of Export with Income Dummies Using the
Heckman and Hotz (1989) Method to Control for Selection Endogeneity
Dependent Variable
Log(Import) Log(Import) Import/GDP
(U.S.$) (local constant currency) (%)
Year   HighIncome 0.059∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.029
(35.88) (37.37) (0.82)
Year   LowIncome 0.042∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
(39.35) (39.35) (11.71)
Selection   HighIncome 0.087∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 3.02∗∗∗
(4.37) (5.28) (7.23)
Selection   LowIncome 0.024∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.52∗∗
(2.06) (2.28) (1.98)
Accession   HighIncome 0.044∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 1.20∗∗∗
(6.90) (5.62) (8.96)
Accession   LowIncome 0.0090∗∗ 0.0087∗∗ –0.20∗∗
(2.07) (2.07) (–1.98)
Intercept –71.79∗∗∗ –70.19∗∗∗ –369.82∗∗∗
(–40.59) (–40.41) (–9.27)
R2 0.705 0.697 0.161
No. of observations 2,859 3,070 3,402
Notes: See table 4.7.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.that both the high-income group and the low-income group had statisti-
cally signiﬁcant and positive increases in log(FDI) due to the accession
eﬀect, while the high-income group saw much bigger increases than the
low-income group (12 to 13 percent vs. 7 to 9 percent per year). Moreover,
there is no strong evidence that the FDI-GDP ratio signiﬁcantly increased
due to the accession eﬀect for both income groups (only one out of four re-
gressions shows statistically positive changes).
One robust ﬁnding across regressions in tables 4.17 and 4.18 is that the
continental-law economies had drastic upward shifts (around 15 or 16 per-
cent) in log(FDI) due to accession. There is weak evidence that the com-
mon-law economies had a higher FDI-GDP ratio due to the accession
eﬀect. The former socialist economies did not show any signiﬁcant changes
in either log(FDI) or FDI-GDP due to accession.
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Table 4.13 Regressions of Measures of Export with Legal Origin Dummies




(U.S.$) (local constant currency) (%)
Year   CommonLaw 0.045∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(25.03) (26.47) (6.41)
Year   ContinentalLaw 0.047∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(36.67) (37.09) (7.28)
Year   Socialist 0.064∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(8.75) (8.89) (3.31)
Selection   CommonLaw 0.085∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 1.95∗∗∗
(4.66) (4.53) (5.49)
Selection   ContinentalLaw –0.0024 0.0076 0.017
(–0.16) (0.53) (0.06)
Selection   Socialist –0.28∗∗∗ –0.28∗∗∗ 4.23∗∗∗
(–5.59) (–5.68) (4.42)
Accession   CommonLaw 0.000095 –0.0019 0.51∗∗∗
(0.01) (–0.29) (3.87)
Accession   ContinentalLaw 0.027∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.20∗
(5.03) (4.59) (1.82)
Accession   Socialist 0.0017 0.0017 –0.77∗
(0.08) (0.08) (–1.72)
Intercept –70.23∗∗∗ –68.13∗∗∗ –394.12∗∗∗
(–33.90) (–33.94) (–9.49)
R2 0.617 0.613 0.138
No. of observations 2,859 3,070 3,402
Notes: See table 4.9.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.4.3.3 Impact on Gross Domestic Product Growth
Tables 4.19 and 4.20 report the regression results on the impact of ac-
cession on the growth rate of GDP, using the Heckman and Hotz (1989)
method and the predicted accession approach to control for the selection
eﬀect. The two tables show consistent results. Classiﬁed by income level,
economies with high per capita income experienced positive and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant increase in their GDP growth after the accession. The im-
pact was around 1.5 percent and 1.6 percent increase in the GDP growth
rate per year for the ten years after accession. For low-income countries,
we cannot ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant changes in GDP growth after
GATT/WTO accession. The two tables also show conﬂicting evidence on
the selection eﬀect for low-income economies. For the high-income group,
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Table 4.14 Regressions of Measures of Export with Legal Origin Dummies




(U.S.$) (local constant currency) (%)
Year   CommonLaw 0.062∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.093
(16.31) (16.66) (0.92)
Year   ContinentalLaw 0.049∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(30.00) (31.03) (8.21)
Year   Socialist 0.053∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗
(7.53) (7.65) (4.97)
Selection   CommonLaw –0.018∗∗∗ –0.017∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗
(–4.39) (–4.25) (2.18)
Selection   ContinentalLaw –0.0052∗∗ –0.0065∗∗∗ –0.18∗∗∗
(–2.23) (–2.94) (–3.94)
Selection   Socialist 0.038 0.038 1.04
(1.11) (1.12) (1.42)
Accession   CommonLaw 0.013∗∗ 0.010∗ 0.73∗∗∗
(2.01) (1.65) (5.73)
Accession   ContinentalLaw 0.028∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗
(5.33) (5.15) (2.31)
Accession   Socialist –0.020 –0.020 –0.89∗
(–0.85) (–0.86) (–1.84)
Intercept –83.62∗∗∗ –82.16∗∗∗ –416.40∗∗∗
(–25.32) (–25.36) (–5.08)
R2 0.613 0.610 0.131
No. of observations 2,859 3,070 3,402
Notes: See table 4.10.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.Table 4.15 Regressions of Measuures of FDI with Income Dummies Using the
Heckman and Hotz (1989) Method to Control for Selection Endogeneity
Dependent Variable
Log(FDI) (U.S.$) FDI/GDP (%)
Year   HighIncome 0.096∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(15.70) (3.46)
Year   LowIncome 0.080∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(18.70) (6.81)
Selection   HighIncome 0.043 0.33
(0.47) (1.09)
Selection   LowIncome 0.057 0.20
(1.44) (1.42)
Accession   HighIncome 0.12∗∗∗ 0.068
(3.63) (0.61)





No. of observations 2,132 2,606
Notes: See table 4.7.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
Table 4.16 Regressions of Measures of FDI on Income Dummies Using Predicted
GATT/WTO Membership to Control for Selection Endogeneity
Dependent Variable
Log(FDI) (U.S.$) FDI/GDP (%)
Year   HighIncome 0.096∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(6.21) (2.97)
Year   LowIncome 0.097∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(15.15) (2.94)
Selection   HighIncome 0.0047 –0.089
(0.03) (–1.62)
Selection   LowIncome –0.023∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗
(–2.92) (2.61)
Accession   HighIncome 0.13∗∗∗ 0.053
(4.10) (0.48)





No. of observations 2,132 2,606
Notes: See table 4.8.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.table 4.20 shows a positive selection eﬀect: that is, high-income economies
qualiﬁed for GATT/WTO membership had a 1.1 percent increase in GDP
growth, besides an 1.5 percent to 1.6 percent increase in GDP growth af-
ter the actual accession.
As for the diﬀerences among economies of diﬀerent legal institutions in
responding to GATT/WTO accessions, table 4.20 shows that the common-
law economies in the sample experienced, on average, a 1 percent increase
in GDP growth after their accession to GATT/WTO, while socialist
economies had a decrease of about 2 percent in GDP growth. Both are sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. However, the same pattern is not present in table 4.19,
which is based on the Hechman and Hotz (1989) method and controlling
for endogeneity of the accessions. One may summarize that there is some
evidence that the common-law economies’ growth rate beneﬁted from
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Table 4.17 Regressions of Measures of FDI with Legal Origin Dummies Using the
Heckman and Hotz (1989) Method to Control for Selection Endogeneity
Dependent Variable
Log(FDI) (U.S.$) FDI/GDP (%)
Year   CommonLaw 0.10∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(17.49) (5.22)
Year   ContinentalLaw 0.071∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(16.27) (4.85)
Year   Socialist 0.27∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(7.09) (3.82)
Selection   CommonLaw –0.015 0.45∗∗
(–0.25) (2.25)
Selection   ContinentalLaw 0.032 0.11
(0.68) (0.64)
Selection   Socialist 0.18 0.19
(1.09) (0.40)
Accession   CommonLaw 0.0084 0.094
(0.34) (1.16)
Accession   ContinentalLaw 0.15∗∗∗ 0.072
(7.04) (0.92)





No. of observations 2,132 2,606
Notes: See table 4.9.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.GATT/WTO accession but that the socialist economies actually suﬀered in
GDP growth.
4.3.4 Impact on Total Factor Productivity
Tables 4.21 to 4.24list results of a set of production function regressions.
The purpose is to study how the accessions aﬀected the economies’ TFP,
which is the residual term in an economy’s aggregate production function.
Regressions in tables 4.21 and 4.22 use dummies for per capita income.
Those in tables 4.23 and 4.24 use dummies for the economies’ legal institu-
tions.
The ﬁrst regressions of tables 4.21 and 4.22 indicate that the high-income
economies did experience a statistically signiﬁcant increase in TFP growth
in the amount of 1 percent per year due to the accession eﬀect, while there
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Table 4.18 Regressions of Measures of FDI with Legal Origin Dummies
Using Predicted GATT/WTO Membership to Control for
Selection Endogeneity
Dependent Variable
Log(FDI) (U.S.$) FDI/GDP (%)
Year   CommonLaw 0.17∗∗∗ 0.055
(9.88) (1.09)
Year   ContinentalLaw 0.073∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(11.07) (2.63)
Year   Socialist 0.29∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(8.06) (4.07)
Selection   CommonLaw –0.081∗∗∗ 0.076
(–4.20) (1.38)
Selection   ContinentalLaw –0.0016 0.023
(–0.19) (0.78)
Selection   Socialist –0.18 0.35
(–1.24) (1.12)
Accession   CommonLaw 0.028 0.154∗∗
(1.18) (2.02)
Accession   ContinentalLaw 0.16∗∗∗ 0.10
(8.10) (1.42)





No. of observations 2,132 2,606
Notes: See table 4.10.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.is some evidence (the ﬁrst regression in table 4.22 but not in table 4.21) that
the low-income economies’ TFP growth also increased by 0.5 percent per
year. More interestingly, in the regressions where we control for the indi-
rect eﬀects of accession via import, export, and FDI, the net eﬀects of ac-
cession on TFP growth for low-income economies are statistically signiﬁ-
cant and positive (1 percent per year) and slightly negative for high-income
economies. This shows that the low-income economies did beneﬁt in terms
of higher economic eﬃciency through the intangible inﬂuences of acces-
sion to GATT/WTO (rather than through the tangible changes in import,
export, and FDI).
From tables 4.23 and 4.24, we can see that there is weak evidence that
both the common-law economy group and the continental-law group ex-
perienced positive accession eﬀects in TFP growth. The magnitude of TFP
increase per year due to GATT/WTO accessions is around 0.5 percent. It
is weak rather than strong evidence because some regressions have statis-
tically signiﬁcant TFP increase but others have insigniﬁcant results. Per-
haps a more interesting ﬁnding is that the socialist accession economies
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Table 4.19 Regressions on Log(GDP) Using the Heckman and Hotz (1989) Method
to Control for Selection Endogeneity
Log(GDP) Log(GDP)
Year   HighIncome 0.039∗∗∗ Year   CommonLaw 0.040∗∗∗
(45.99) (43.70)
Year   LowIncome 0.038∗∗∗ Year   ContinentalLaw 0.037∗∗∗
(59.32) (54.47)
Selection   HighIncome 0.011 Year   Socialist 0.039∗∗∗
(1.12) (14.71)
Selection   LowIncome 0.013∗ Selection   CommonLaw 0.051∗∗∗
(1.88) (5.58)
Accession   HighIncome 0.016∗∗∗ Selection   ContinentalLaw –0.013
(4.75) (–1.55)
Accession   LowIncome –0.0024 Selection   Socialist –0.099
(–0.92) (–4.46)
Intercept –51.40∗∗∗ Accession   CommonLaw 0.0045
(–50.97) (1.28)
Accession   Continetal 0.0016
(0.55)




R2 0.757 R2 0.735
No. of observations 3,647 No. of observations 3,647
Notes: See table 4.7.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.had no positive increases in TFP due to the accession eﬀect. In fact, after
separating the indirect eﬀects via import, export, and FDI, we ﬁnd that the
direct eﬀect of accession on TFP growth was about –1.1 percent per year.
4.3.5 Summary and Interpretation of the Findings
Overall, the ﬁndings of our regressions can be summarized in two parts.
First, in terms of engaging more international trade and attracting
more FDI, both the high-income and low-income groups made signiﬁcant
progress, with the high-income group having much more gains than the
other group. In this regard, both the common-law country group and the
continental-law group saw signiﬁcant increase, while the former socialist
economies had either insigniﬁcant or mixed changes due to the acces-
sions.
Second, with regard to changes in the growth rate of the economywide
TFP, the high-income group and the common-law as well as continental-
law economies saw signiﬁcant increases due to their accessions to GATT/
WTO. The low-income group and the former socialist economies had ei-
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Table 4.20 Regressions of Log(GDP) Using Predicted GATT/WTO Membership to
Control for Selection Endogeneity
Log(GDP) Log(GDP)
Year   HighIncome 0.032∗∗∗ Year   CommonLaw 0.040∗∗∗
(19.81) (21.99)
Year   LowIncome 0.040∗∗∗ Year   ContinentalLaw 0.040∗∗∗
(49.85) (44.04)
Selection   HighIncome 0.011 Year   Socialist 0.036∗∗∗
(5.85) (14.08)
Selection   LowIncome –0.044∗∗∗ Selection   CommonLaw 0.029
(–3.97) (1.43)
Accession   HighIncome 0.016∗∗∗ Selection   ContinentalLaw –0.0069∗∗∗
(5.18) (–5.45)
Accession   LowIncome –0.0046 Selection   Socialist –0.044∗∗
(–0.92) (–2.54)
Intercept –49.39∗∗∗ Accession   CommonLaw 0.010∗∗∗
(–32.69) (3.06)
Accession   Continetal 0.0011
(0.40)




R2 0.760 R2 0.733
No. of observations 3,647 No. of observations 3,647
Notes: See table 4.8.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.ther insigniﬁcant or even slightly negative changes in their productivity due
to the accessions.
The ﬁndings lend themselves to easy interpretations. Economic back-
wardness, as indexed by low per capita income, did not seem to be an im-
portant positive factor enabling an economy to beneﬁt from joining
GATT/WTO. Initial economic institutions before joining international
organizations are shown to be much more important. Economies with
proper initial economic institutions are positioned to beneﬁt most from
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Table 4.21 Production Function Regressions with Income Dummies Using the
Heckman and Hotz (1989) Method to Control for Selection Endogeneity
Dependent Variable
Log(GDP) Log(GDP)
Year   HighIncome 0.023∗∗∗ 0.0082∗∗∗
(21.19) (6.26)
Year   LowIncome 0.0065∗∗∗ 0.0031∗
(3.98) (1.87)
Log(Capital)   HighIncome 0.59∗∗∗ 0.588∗∗∗
(30.00) (20.91)
Log(Capital)   LowIncome 0.58∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗
(35.85) (42.29)
Log(Labor)   HighIncome 0.022 0.40∗∗∗
(0.58) (7.28)
Log(Labor)   LowIncome 0.66∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
(11.28) (7.60)
Selection   HighIncome 0.0023 –0.046∗∗∗
(0.26) (–3.69)
Selection   LowIncome –0.0070 –0.0031
(–1.28) (–0.69)
Accession   HighIncome 0.010∗∗∗ –0.0063∗
(3.53) (–1.71)











No. of observations 3,377 2,304
Notes: See table 4.7.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.joining GATT/WTO. Countries with ineﬃcient institutions such as the so-
cialist economic system were found to beneﬁt little, if not negatively, from
the accession.
4.4 Concluding Remarks
In the spirit of event study, we put together a large panel data set with
over 112 economies covering the years from 1960 to 1998. Seventy-four of
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Table 4.22 Production Function Regressions with Income Dummies Using Predicted
GATT/WTO Membership to Control for Selection Endogeneity
Dependent Variable
Log(GDP) Log(GDP)
Year   HighIncome 0.020∗∗∗ 0.00037∗
(13.23) (1.81)
Year   LowIncome 0.0071∗∗∗ 0.0031∗
(4.38) (1.89)
Log(Capital)   HighIncome 0.59∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗
(29.91) (22.54)
Log(Capital)   LowIncome 0.58∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗
(36.30) (41.71)
Log(Labor)   HighIncome 0.019 0.32∗∗∗
(0.52) (6.35)
Log(Labor)   LowIncome 0.75∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(12.77) (7.49)
Selection   HighIncome 0.0042∗∗∗ 0.0056∗∗∗
(2.93) (3.06)
Selection   LowIncome –0.0068∗∗∗ –0.00066
(–7.84) (–0.75)
Accession   HighIncome 0.010∗∗∗ –0.0077∗∗
(3.89) (–2.14)











No. of observations 3,377 2,304
Notes: See table 4.8.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.Table 4.23 Production Function Regressions with Legal Origin Dummies Using the
Heckman and Hotz (1989) Method to Control for Selection Endogeneity
Dependent Variable
Log(GDP) Log(GDP)
Year   CommonLaw 0.018∗∗∗ 0.0091∗∗∗
(17.26) (7.82)
Year   ContinentalLaw 0.019∗∗∗ 0.0052∗∗∗
(50.61) (4.79)
Year   Socialist 0.0092∗∗∗ 0.0092∗∗∗
(4.32) (4.28)
Log(Capital)   HighIncome 0.69∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗
(35.58) (25.08)
Log(Capital)   LowIncome 0.69∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗
(35.58) (25.08)
Log(Labor)   HighIncome 0.57∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗
(33.80) (41.30)
Log(Labor)   LowIncome 0.21∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗
(5.89) (8.37)
Selection   CommonLaw 0.026∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(3.43) (3.54)
Selection   ContinentalLaw –0.022∗∗∗ –0.0091∗
(–3.51) (–1.71)
Selection   Socialist –0.070∗∗∗ –0.099∗∗∗
(–3.91) (–6.45)
Accession   CommonLaw 0.0042 0.0041
(1.53) (1.49)
Accession   ContinentalLaw 0.0041∗ 0.0064∗∗∗
(1.83) (2.67)











No. of observations 3,377 2,304
Notes: See table 4.9.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.Table 4.24 Production Function Regressions with Legal Origin Dummies




Year   CommonLaw 0.026∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(16.75) (9.31)
Year   ContinentalLaw 0.022∗∗∗ 0.0039∗∗∗
(19.64) (3.15)
Year   Socialist 0.0078∗∗∗ 0.0054∗∗
(3.75) (2.54)
Log(Capital)   HighIncome 0.71∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗
(36.36) (25.37)
Log(Capital)   LowIncome 0.58∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗
(34.79) (41.76)
Log(Labor)   HighIncome 0.074∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(1.97) (6.22)
Log(Labor)   LowIncome 0.18∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗
(4.86) (8.76)
Selection   CommonLaw –0.0087∗∗∗ –0.011∗∗∗
(–5.62) (–5.57)
Selection   ContinentalLaw –0.0050∗∗∗ 0.00074
(–5.16) (0.80)
Selection   Socialist –0.042∗∗∗ –0.0032∗∗∗
(–3.34) (–0.32)
Accession   CommonLaw 0.0095∗∗∗ 0.0068∗∗∗
(3.72) (2.65)
Accession   ContinentalLaw 0.0020 0.0049∗∗
(0.97) (2.19)











No. of observations 3,377 2,304
Notes: See table 4.10.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.them became members of GATT/WTO during the sample period. We
study the changes in GDP growth, capital stock, import, export, FDI, and
TFP of the accession economies around the year of joining GATT/WTO,
using the rest of economies as references. We allow the possibility that dif-
ferent types of economies responded diﬀerently around the event. The classi-
ﬁcations of the type of the economies are by per capita income and by ini-
tial economic institutions.
The ﬁndings indicate that the economy group with per capita income
higher than US$3,000 (in 1987) beneﬁted much more than the lower-
income group. Countries of common-law origin beneﬁted much more than
those of continental-law origin. The former socialist economies had little
gain associated with the accession. These ﬁndings cast serious doubt on
the commonly received belief that backwardness in economic development
is an advantage of economic growth. Instead, the ﬁndings provide evidence
that having proper initial economic institutions is important for economic
development via globalization for a developing economy.
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Comment Simon Johnson
The authors have selected an excellent topic. Does joining the WTO help
or hurt economic growth? There are some interesting rival hypotheses. For
example, perhaps foreign direct investment will decline after a country
joins the WTO, as ﬁrms no longer have an incentive to engage in “tariﬀwall
jumping.” More generally, there may be two forms of WTO accession:
those that genuinely promote more trade and growth, and those that pri-
marily beneﬁt a controlling elite by facilitating greater expropriation of
one form or another. It is also theoretically possible that WTO accession
might lead to more or less political instability.
This paper oﬀers an appealing event-study-type methodology to study
accession. Looking at a window of (–5,  10) and using annual data and
country ﬁxed eﬀects for all countries that joined GATT/WTO since 1960 is
surely a sensible way to proceed. It is also attractive to start with simple
measures and then add more complex indicators of performance. Dividing
countries into low, middle, and high income is reasonable, although it does
prompt the reader to wonder about deeper underlying causes of per capita
income levels (e.g., is this the result of institutions or geographical condi-
tions or something else that might cause an important omitted variable
problem?) Examining the eﬀect of initial institutions is also an important
step.
The authors’ ﬁndings are thought-provoking, and they have done us a
great service by pulling together an invaluable data set (table 4.1 will be
widely cited). I’m sure they (and others) will subject their results to a great
deal more in the form of robustness checks, particularly looking at the
eﬀects of institutions. Examining ﬁve-year average values or decade aver-
ages (before and after) would be appealing. We also need more detail on
when exactly negotiations began, in order to think about alternative “win-
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agement, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a faculty research fellow of the Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research.dows.” Given the work by Dani Rodrik and Bill Easterly on the slowdown
of growth in developing countries, we particularly need to see various al-
ternative controls for time eﬀects (Rodrik 1999; Easterly 2001).
Looking forward to the research that will build on this paper, re-
searchers must get to grips with the mechanism through which WTO ac-
cession brings economic beneﬁts. Reducing tariﬀs and nontariﬀ barriers
may have direct positive eﬀects. It could also be the case that accession is a
form of commitment by local elites not to engage in some forms of expro-
priation. This appears to be an important role of European Union (EU)
accession in Eastern Europe—political elites in Hungary and Poland, for
example, are much more constrained than their counterparts in Belarus
and Ukraine, because breaking with the EU accession process would have
large political and economic costs. But how general is this eﬀect?
Future research could use the method of Rajan and Zingales (1998), or
perhaps the recent alternative proposal of Fisman and Love (2002), to look
more at which sectors grow faster and slower with WTO accession. To
what extent do the sectoral eﬀects vary with income level or institutions? Is
there any indication that the rich and powerful within countries gain dis-
proportionately?
The main worry with this kind of study is of course identiﬁcation. Per-
haps it is the case that countries join the WTO when they were going to
grow anyway. The authors again take an important step in their analysis of
selection, but in the next round of research, we should look for situations
in which the trade regime is in some sense exogenous—that is, the eﬀect of
joining the WTO is well identiﬁed. Alternatively, we need an instrumental
variable that both is correlated with trade liberalization and can be ex-
cluded from the main regression. Studies of trade and ﬁnancial liberaliza-
tion currently lack such instruments.
The emerging conventional wisdom on liberalizations seems to be some
form of the new “Columbia School” view. There are diﬀerences in the
views of Bhagwati, Sachs, Stiglitz, and Rodrik (formerly at Columbia) on
this issue, but all warn strongly against ﬁnancial liberalization, particularly
as it may lead to vulnerability to panics and speculative attacks (Bhagwati
1998; Radelet and Sachs 1998; Sachs and Warner 1997; Stiglitz 2002; Ro-
drik 1997). At the same time, at least three of these four remain broadly
sympathetic to trade liberalization. The next generation of research will
hopefully test these ideas directly and with properly identiﬁed regressions.
Some of the historical evidence should make us cautious about expect-
ing all trade liberalizations to have positive eﬀects. The rapid growth of ex-
ternal trade in Europe after 1500 was associated with very diﬀerent eco-
nomic and political changes in diﬀerent places. In Northwest Europe the
growth of trade led to broad-based economic progress, contributing to the
conditions that made the Industrial Revolution possible. In Spain and Por-
144 David D. Li and Changqi Wutugal, the growth of trade strengthened absolutist monarchs as they cap-
tured important new cash revenues. And in Eastern Europe the evidence
suggests that growing trade may have contributed to the so-called “second
serfdom.” Who wins and who loses from the growth of trade may depend
a great deal on the precise nature of initial institutions and the distribution
of power within society.
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Comment Epictetus E. Patalinghug
Introduction
The study by Li and Wu attempts to assess the impact of the GATT/
WTO accession on the domestic economy. It adopts the event-study
method to assess the impact of the WTO on the domestic economy. The au-
thors used this method in two ways: (1) to assess the impact of the acces-
sion on each of the economic variables (e.g., GDP, capital formation, im-
port, export, and FDI), and (2) to assess the impact of the accession on the
economywide productivity. The following discussion provides comments
on the link between the WTO accession and market access. It likewise dis-
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ness Administration, University of the Philippines.cusses the logic of the regression results vis-à-vis the assumed hypothesis.
And it concludes with suggestions on improving the style of the paper.
WTO Accession and Market Access
The objective of assessing the impact of the GATT/WTO accession on
the domestic economy is a desirable one. However, the assumption that ac-
cession is identical with market access, as well as with the reduction in tariﬀ
and nontariﬀ barriers, is not. The hypothesis of the study that GATT/
WTO accession usually means better market access for foreign investors
and therefore stimulates the inﬂow of FDI is most probably inappropriate.
In reality, WTO accession in many countries may not be identical with
market access or tariﬀ reduction several years after accession. Several
countries negotiate the magnitude, extent, and timing of their market ac-
cess or tariﬀ-reduction commitments before accession. Consider the case
of two WTO member countries: the Philippines and Thailand. The Philip-
pines was accepted into GATT in 1979 and Thailand in 1982. But until very
recently trade in motor vehicles, cement, sugar, and rice (among other
commodities) between the two countries is still hampered by relatively high
tariﬀ rates.
Special and diﬀerential treatment (SND) for developing countries is ac-
knowledged as an integral part of WTO negotiations and WTO rules. The
Agreement on Agriculture provided SND to developing countries in the
form of (1) lesser reduction commitments on market access, export subsi-
dies, and domestic support; (2) longer time frames for implementation of
commitments; (3) greater market access in developed countries; and (4)
exemption from reduction commitments (e.g., investment subsidies, agri-
cultural input subsidies, subsidies to reduce marketing cost of agricultural
products, etc.). This aspect of WTO negotiation implies that accession is
not identical with market access.
In some instances, trade patterns are not very sensitive to changes in
tariﬀ rates. The volume of intra–Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) trade has not increased beyond the 17–23 percent range after the
gradual implementation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) tariﬀ
rates. Singapore accounts for most of the intra-ASEAN trade (Austria and
Avila 2001; Teh 1993). On the contrary, the volume of trade between indi-
vidual ASEAN countries and the United States or Japan (e.g., Singapore–
United States trade or Thailand-Japan trade) is much larger than any bi-
lateral intra-ASEAN trade. This pattern continues even if WTO tariﬀrates
are relatively higher than AFTA tariﬀ rates.
Regression Results
The regression results on the impact of the accessions on the growth rate
of GDP indicate that high-income economies experienced a positive im-
pact of about a 1.5 percent to 1.6 percent increase in the GDP growth rate
146 David D. Li and Changqi Wuper year for ten years after accession, while no signiﬁcant increase was ob-
served for low-income economies after accession. Similarly, high-income
countries experienced signiﬁcant increases in growth of capital, growth of
import, growth of export, growth of FDI, and growth of total factor pro-
ductivity as compared to low-income countries. Based on these ﬁndings,
the authors conclude that the advantage of backwardness as hypothesized
by Gerschenkron does not apply in this case; rather, they assert that what
is more important are the initial economic institutions before joining
GATT/WTO. The authors’ empirical ﬁndings are consistent with the
growing perception of less-developed country (LDC) members of WTO
that the 1995 WTO agreements were disadvantageous to them. These ﬁnd-
ings provide support to LDCs’ attempt to eliminate or prohibit in the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture the practice of twenty-ﬁve developed countries
of continuing to provide export subsidies. This is the biggest contributor to
unfair trade in agriculture.
One conclusion from the authors’ ﬁndings is that trade liberalization
due to WTO accession has a varying impact on each country (low-income
country vs. high-income country, or common-law country vs. socialist
country). Some studies suggested that trade-GDP ratios fall as per capita
income rises, while other studies showed that export-promoting economies
exhibited a rise in trade-GDP ratios as per capita incomes grew rapidly.
Among the GATT/WTO member countries, export-promoting countries
may emerge as more successful compared to import-substituting countries
(Bhagwati 1988). Although WTO accession can be interpreted as acceler-
ating the momentum for a freer world trading system, this study’s ﬁndings
support the view that trade-GDP ratio increases as per capita income rises.
But its most revealing ﬁnding is that WTO accession is not an opportunity
to level the playing ﬁeld. On the contrary, it favors high-income economies
that are initially endowed with good economic institutions.
Selection Endogeneity
In addressing the issue of selection endogeneity, the authors employed
two measures of the selection variable: one using the Heckman-Hotz
method, and the other using the estimated qualiﬁcation date that is pre-
dicted by ﬁtting a probit regression method. In analyzing its ﬁndings, the
authors conveniently cite the estimates from either measure, whichever is
signiﬁcant or sensible. Since the impact of the economic variables on ac-
cession does not change signiﬁcantly by using either of the two alternative
approaches to control for the selection eﬀect, the paper would be reduced
to a manageable length if it simply presented the regression estimates us-
ing the Heckman-Hotz method. In its present form, more than 50 percent
of the paper consists of tables from alternative regression runs, whose in-
clusion in the paper has marginal contribution in the analysis of its ﬁnd-
ings.
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Nevertheless, this paper is a pioneering eﬀort at assessing the impact of
GATT/WTO accession across countries.
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